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The ultimate objective of law enforcement in the small loan field is the permanent
suppression of the business of making illegal small loans rather than the imposition
of penalties upon isolated instances of law breaking. The value of particular remedies
and the wisdom of bringing criminal prosecutions or civil actions of particular types
depend upon the degree in which they tend to achieve this result.
Permanent suppression of the illegal small loan business will be aided- or retarded
in any particular state according to the number and variety of the legal techniques
available for the purpose. The available facilities of this nature differ widely in the
various states. In those states which have enacted adequate small loan laws2 perma-
nent suppression may be accomplished.3 But, inasmuch as illegal lending naturally
flourishes most vigorously in states where effective small loan laws do not exist, its
suppression must necessarily be accomplished to a considerable extent by the use of
remedies other than those provided by small loan laws. The number and variety of
these independent remedies are sufficient in most states to make possible substantial
curbing if not permanent elimination of illegal lending when employed with a
discrimination growing out of an understanding of the nature of the problem to be
solved.
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'Due to limitations of space, citations to particular statutes and other documentary material have been
omitted in some cases. Such citations and more complete treatment of many matters herein touched upon
may be found in one or more of the following: CAMALIER, PERSONAL FINANCE LAws (Am. Ass'n of Per-
sonal Finance Cos., 1938); HUBAcHExc, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN LAwS (Russell Sage Foundation,
1938); YOUNG, PERSONAL FINANCE COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTIcES, (Nat. Bur. Econ. Res. 1940)
33-35; Horack, A Survey of the General Usury Laws, supra p. 36 and the accompanying chart, pp. 48-53;
Report of the Special Committee of the International Association of Governmental Labor Offcials on the
Enforcement of Laws Against Loan Sharks (U. S. Dep't Labor, Bur. Labor Statistics, I940), summarized
without citations in (940) 50 MoN. LAB. REv. 105r.
'A majority of the states have adequate small loan laws. They are cited and evaluated in other articles
in this symposium.
'No kind or amount of law enforcement will stop the borrowing of small sums of money at high and
illegal rates of charge unless legitimate sources of loans are provided for classes of borrowers now served
only by loan sharks. This necessitates the authorization of charges which are sufficiently high to permit
such loans to yield profits, but which nevertheless may be a small fraction of those now charged by loan
sharks. Hence, the discussion of effective law enforcement in this paper- is qualified by recognition of the
fact that permanent solution of the small loan problem requires establishment of legitimate sources of credit
under regulatory laws such as the small loan laws.
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NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
It would be natural to inquire why the borrower cannot protect himself by invok-
ing whatever rights and defenses the usury laws give him. If a loan contract is
usurious, it is often assumed without question that the usury law will provide a
sufficient remedy. In practice, usury laws have failed to do so in this field of lending. 4
The lending of small sums illegally to wage earners as a substantial business is of
relatively recent origin.5 Usury laws, which have existed for more than 300 years
without any substantial change in form, do not provide a means to cope with this
new problem. Borrowers of small sums do not possess the reserves of money neces-
sary to pay lawyers or the time to appear in court to defend themselves. They are
dependent upon their daily wages for a living. Usury laws were designed to regulate
relations between lenders and borrowers who stand in something approaching an
equal bargaining position. The rights and remedies provided by these laws are mild
in nature and they do not become effective except as the result of affirmative action
by the borrower or someone acting on his behalf.
There is a general realization that the relations between wage earner debtors and
those from whom they borrow have created a social problem. But there seems to be
only limited public appreciation of the relative helplessness of the borrower and the
consequent necessity that representatives of the public interest themselves on his
behalf if the public interest is to be adequately protected and a solution of this social
problem achieved.6
'In granting injenctive relief at the suit of the state against the continuation of a usurious wage buying
scheme, the Supreme Court of Kansas in the following language held the remedies of the individual
borrowers under the usury law were inadequate: "But, according to plaintiffs' allegations, the truth of
which is conceded by the demurrers, this statute is systematically set at naught by the defendants. Between
money lender and borrower, of course, it is altogether ineffective until invoked in some lawsuit. And
according to the plaintiffs' allegations such a lawsuit will not arise once in every hundred times the
usurious toll is taken from the wages of his victim. The wage earner has no time to attend court nor
means to employ a lawyer to invoke the defense to the usurers claim accorded by this statute. He must
earn wages every working day to support his family. If garnishment proceedings are instituted which
will bring his employer into court on matters of no concern to that employer, the unfortunate debtor is
discharged. This dread consequence to the debtor can only be avoided by continued submission to de-
fendants' usurious exactions.
"... In the situation portrayed by plaintiffs, it is perfectly obvious that for the hundreds of indigent
debtors held in financial peonage by defendants the remedy supplied by law is pitifully inadequate;
State ex rel. Smith v. M61ahon, 128 Kan. 772, 280 Pac. 9o6, 66 A. L. R. 1072 (1929).
See NUOENT, CONSUMER CREDIT AND ECONOMIC STABILITY (Russell Sage Foundation, 1939) c. III.
The principles underlying the right of intervention of public authorities for the purpose of pro-
tecting the public welfare have been best stated by the United States Supreme Court in the landmark
case of In re Debs as follows: "Every government, entrusted by the very terms of its being with powers
and duties to be exercised and discharged for the general welfare, has a right to aplly to its own courts
for any proper assistance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the other. . . . The obligations
which it is under to promote the interest of all and to prevent the wrongdoing of one resulting in injury
to the general welfare is often of itself sufficient to give it a standing in court." 158 U. S. 564, 584 (1895).
The Supreme Court of Tennessee has applied these same principles to the loan shark situation in the
following language: "The near relation between the economic and social structure and impecunious bor-
rowers is such as to authorize measures for the protection of that helpless class from the consequences of
their stupidity, folly, or helplessness. Their injurious exploitation by persons who lend money is calculated
to increase poverty and spread mendicancy and so injure the public." State ex rel. v. Family Loan Co.,
x67 Tenn. 654, 73 S. W. (2d) 167 (1934).
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This helplessness of the borrower arises from the extreme disparity in the relative
economic positions of lenders and borrowers of small sums and the practical inability
of such borrowers to protect themselves after the contracts have been signed.7 In
this respect the wage earner borrower is distinguishable from the typical borrower
for commercial purposes, who is sufficiently strong economically to avoid being
seriously imposed upon. The typical consumer borrower is pathetically incapable of
securing a fair bargain at the outset. He is usually ignorant of the rights accorded
him by law after he has become indebted. He lacks the time and money necessary
for an effective insistence upon those rights of which he may be aware. He is con-
stantly reminded by the lender that any defensive move on his part will be attended
with disastrous consequences to himself. The lender can and will retaliate by gar-
nisheeing his wages (which often results in loss of his job), 8 by seizing his property,
by injuring his reputation and peace of mind through repeated dunning visits, letters,
and.telephone calls, not only to himself but to his friends, relatives, and employer,
and by innumerable other methods. He must even fear the loss of the source of
credit available through the loan shark. His lack of information, his inability to
fight, and his precarious economic position make yielding to the usurer's demands
appear preferable to facing the seemingly overwhelming consequences of defiance. 9
The weakness of borrowers has been viciously exploited by the modern loan
shark.10 As a class, these lenders are notorious for their continued and deliberate
defiance of law and their disregard for the consequences of their anti-social practices.
In many communities their operations have created such a drain upon the resources
of large numbers of wage earners that the general standard of living has been mate-
rially reduced. The degenerative consequences of such situations concern not only
the individuals involved, but the entire community."- In view of these consequences,
' "In the very nature of things, such borrowers are frequently illiterate, often inexperienced, and usually
as a result of ignorance, inexperience, poverty, or necessity incapable of d1efending themselves against
wrongful, oppressive, fraudulent, or extortionate exactions by the lender." Liberty Finance Co. v. Catterton,
r6x Md. 65o, 158 Ad. x6 (1932). See also In re Home Discount Company, 147 Fed. 538 (D. C. Ala.,
x9o6); Shaw v. Fox, 55 S. W. (2d) ii (Ky. Ct. App., 1932); Commonwealth v. Donoghue, 250 Ky. 343,
63 S. W. (2d) 3, 89 A. L. R. 819 (1933); Ravit v. St'eurele, 257 Ky. xo8, 77 S. W. (2d) 36o (Ct. App.,
1934); State ex rel. v. Family Loan Co., supra note 6; Cotton v. Cooper, 209 S. W. 35 (Tex. Com. App.,
1919). 'See In re Home Discount Co., and Cotton v. Cooper, supra note 7.
' See an article in the Atlanta journal, Nov. 24, 1940, in which conditions caused by loan.sharks in
Georgia are described. Quoting from a report made by Attorney General Ellis Arnall to Governor Rivers,
the article contains the following statement: "The public generally has been reluctant to co-operate because
most victims of the 'loan shark racket' apparently are afraid to disclose facts for fear that interest rates
will be increased on their obligations or that they will be 'blacklisted' and also on account of 'the policy
of employers firing their employes when demand is made on them to pay their employes' financial obli-
gations. Many anonymous complaints which are of no value as evidence indicate this fear on the part of
victims, and other victims, while giving information, refuse to become witnesses, execute affidavits or
testify in an action against the loan company." See note 6 supra, and Birkhead, Collection Tactics ol
Illegal Lenders, supra p. 78.
" The term "loan shark" in recent years has come to mean a money lender who makes illegally high
charges to necessitous, ignorant, or gullible wage earners and other persons of moderate income. This
term and "illegal lender" are used in that sense in this article.
"Supra note 9. The article again quotes from the Attorney General's report as follows: "It is also
found that the method of operation employed by such companies is undesirable and detrimental to the
public welfare."
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it is not possible to conclude that such lenders justify their existence by contributing
a valuable service; to the contrary their excesses add to rather than subtract from the
sum total of economic maladjustment.1 2
The suppression of abuses in the field of consumer lending is thus a matter of
proper and necessary public concern just as is the suppression of crime or of other
anti-social conduct. Public authorities have a consequent duty to take whatever
action may be necessary to minimize these abuses. As has been well said:
"... the ruling ... that the exaction of usury is a mere contractual matter of no concern
to anybody but the parties themselves, is imperatively in need of revision in the light of the
complex social and economic conditions brought about by the industrial development in
the last century since that doctrine was announced."' 3
Adequate accomplishment of this duty on the part of public authorities depends
upon an understanding of the many devices used by loan sharks to escape the impact
of usury and other laws. The usurious character of loan shark contracts is almost
invariably concealed.'
4
"If an express stipulation for the repayment of the sum advanced be indispensable to
the existence of usury, he must be a bungler indeed, who frames his contract on such terms
as to expose himself to the penalties of the law."' 5
Many of the innumerable devices used for this purpose are designed to conceal
the fact that the particular transaction is a loan of money. A favorite is the device of
casting the loan in the form of a purchase or sale of wages, merchandise certificates,
insurance policies, or various other kinds of property, the purpose being to require
treatment of the profit from the transaction as resulting from the purchase or sale
rather than as interest. These devices fail when the true nature and intent of the
transaction is demonstrated, inasmuch as courts will disregard the pretended form
and apply the usury laws if the transaction is in fact a loan.' 6 Sometimes such devices
also run afoul of laws other than those regulating interest, such as those concerning
insurance or the sale of securities. One such device has been held to violate the
Kansas Trading Stamp Act.1 7
" See article by Joseph A. Padway, Counsel, American Federation of Labor, Minnesota Supreme Court
Deals a Death Blow to the "Loan Shark," (1939) 46 Am. F aERATroNxsr 975.
"a State ex rel. Smith v. McMahon, supra note 4. See also note 6, supra, and Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 2o6 U. S. 230 (907); U. S. v. American Bond & Mortgage Co., 31 F. (2d) 448 (D. C. Ill.
1929), afl'd, without discussion of this point, 52 F. (2d) 38 (C.. C. A. 7th, 1931); People v. Tool, 35
Colo. 225, 86 Pac. 224, 6 L. R. A. (N.s.) 822 (1905); Trust Co. of Georgia v. State, 1o9 Ga. 736, 36 S. E.
823 (i9o0); State v. Lindsey, 85 Kan. 79, ix6 Pac. 207 (1ga1); Commonwealth v. McGovern, x6 Ky.
212, 75 S. W. 26! (1903); Repass v. Commonwealth, 131 Ky. 807, 115 S. W. 1131 (1909) 21 L. R. A.
(N.s.) 836"(19o9); Kentucky State Board of Dental Examiners v. Payne, 213 Ky. 382, 281 S. NV. 188
(xg6); State v. Pacific Express Co., 8o Neb. 823, 115 N. W. 619 (i9o9); State v. C. B. & Q. R. R., 88
Neb. 669, 13o N. W. 2-95 (1911); State ex rel. McCarter v. firemen's Insurance CO., 74 N. J. Eq. 372, 73
At. 8o (i9o9); State v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N. I. Eq. 504, 179 At. 116 (1935).
14 For a discussion of evasive devices see HuACmE, op. tt. supra note x, pt. III; and Collins, Evasion
and Avoidance of Usury Laws, supra p. 54.
"
5 Chief Justice Marshall in Scott v. Lloyd, 34 U. S. (9 Pet.) 418 (835).
" HuBACIhK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 152 et seq.
"'State v. Buchman, toi P. (2d) 885 (Sup. Ct. Kan. 1940).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Where the transaction is admittedly a loan, other devices are employed to conceal
the fact that all or a part of the charges paid by the borrower or received by the lender
are interest. Such concealment is often attempted, for example, by disguising the
excessive charges as fees for supposed brokerage services performed by purportedly
independent third persons who actually serve the lender, or by taking two notes (one
for the actual principal with legal interest on which suit may be brought, and the
other for the excessive portion of the charges), or by incorporating in the ostensible
principal of the notes amounts representing excessive, charges.
A current scheme involving attempted concealment of the nature of the charge is
the device of providing in consideration of a special "hazard" fee for a release of the
borrower's obligation to repay in the event of the occurrence of a specified con-
tingedicy, such as the borrower's death or the destruction of collateral security. This
device seeks to take advantage of the principle that interest limitations do not apply
if a loan is not repayable in all events.' 8 But it fails to accomplish this purpose if the
occurrence of the contingency is so unlikely or the contingency itself is so unrelated
to the hazards normally incident to debtor-creditor relationships as to render the con-
tingency illusory. The Pacific Finance Corporation operating in the state of New
York was recently required by a court decree to refund to borrowers approximately
$250,000 of interest overcharges resulting from the use of this device.' 9 Such contracts
may also fall within the statutory definitions of insurance contracts and render the
lender subject to penalties provided for engaging in the insurance business without a
license.2 0
Still other less ingenious devices are designed to conceal acts of outright fraud
or chicanery, such as short changing the borrower at the time the principal is
advanced or falsifying the records of periods or amounts involved.
Any given contract may include more than one of these devices. Courts will
always receive oral evidence to prove the usurious or other illegal character of any
contract of loan, regardless of the method adopted to conceal the fact of illegality.21
"... where the contract is in truth for the borrowing and lending of money, no form
which can be given to it will free it from the taint of usury, if more than legal interest
be secured....
"Courts, therefore, perceived the necessity of disregarding the form, and examining into
the real nature of the transaction. If that be in fact a loan, no shift or device will protect
it."2
2
18 HUBACHEK, Op. Cit. supra note i, at 163
l'See N. Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1940; N. Y. Herald Tribune, May 3, 1940; an unreported decree
entered by Justice Miller in People v. Pacific Finance Corporation (Sup. Ct., N. Y., Apr. 22, 1940); and
Bennett and Heffner, The Campaign Against Auto Loan Usurers in New York State (Conf. on Personal
Finance Law, 1940). The Pacific Finance Corporation referred to should not be confused with the com-
pany of the same name operating in California or other identically named organizations operating elsewhere.
" See Annotations and the cases therein cited in 35 A. L. R. 1039, 63 A. L. R. 726, and zoo A. L. R.
1454, and the close cases of Att'y Gen. ex rel. Monk v. Osgood Co., 249 Mass. 473, 144 N. E. 371, 35
A. L. R. 1037 (1924); M. K. & T. Trust Co. v. McLachlen, 59 Minn. 468, 61 N. W. 56o (x894); and
Ollendorff Watch Co. v. Pink, 279 N. Y. 32, 17 N. E. (2d)' 676 (938).
HIUTHtACMMI, op. cit. supra note i at 152 et seq.
"Supra note 15.
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Proof of the essentially usurious character of such devices is simplified when they
have been repeatedly used. Isolated transactions of these unusual types may be bona
fide and based on expedient reasons but there can seldom be any reason to resort
continuously to such cumbersome methods except to avoid usury laws. Thus the
mere showing of continuity will be accepted as evidence of the real intention of the
lender 23
Evasive devices of loan sharks are not limited to contractual manipulations but
they extend also to the adoption of forms of business organization and methods of
doing business adapted for the same protective purposes. Loan shark organizations
are carefully planned to minimize the possibility of effective punitive action. They
are frequently interstate in character, thus facilitating prompt transfer of persons and
assets from state to state to minimize the possibility of arrest, sequestration of assets,
and service of civil process. The identity of the principals is often concealed and
business is carried on through agents, perhaps operating under unregistered trade
names. When information as to the ownership or personnel of the business must be
recorded publicly, the names of dummy owners or managers are used.
In proceeding against loan sharks prompt and decisive action is necessary to pre-
vent nullification of efforts through removals across state lines. Inasmuch as it is
usually futile to prosecute subordinates, who are often well paid to submit to punish-
ment, it is necessary to determine the true identity of the principals and to bring
pressure to bear upon them directly.
LEGAL TEcHm S
In order to achieve a maximum degree of effectiveness with the greatest economy
of time and money, law enforcement efforts should be based upon a use of those of
the following legal techniques which give the greatest promise of putting an im-
mediate and permanent stop to the activities of the loan shark. The typical loan
shark continues in business solely to make money. He will go out of business just
as soon as the prospect of profit disappears or the persofial danger of criminal prosecu-
tion and imprisonment becomes so great as to overcome the desire for profit. Con-
sequently, the use of remedies which tend to eliminate profits as well as those which
tend to place the loan shark personally in criminal jeopardy will most effectively
accomplish the suppression of illegal lending.
The statutes most frequently violated by loan sharks are, of course, those regulat-
ing the rights of debtors and creditors. In the absence of statute, loan contracts are
not limited as to permissible rates of charge.24 Nearly every stat, however, has
enacted statutes dealing with interest limitations and other aspects of money lending.
These include (i) usury laws, (2) wage assignment laws, (3) chattel mortgage laws,
(4) property and wage exemption laws, (5)"small loan laws, and (6) miscellaneous
laws regulating various particular types of lending, such as credit union laws, indus-
trial banking laws, and general banking laws. In special circumstances of the kinds
24 27 R. C. L. 203.2' HuBcaMX, op. cit. supra note x, at 154.
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previously mentioned, other laws, such as insurance laws, security laws, and trading
stamp laws, are applicable. Not all of these laws are in force in every state, but some
at least are in effect in practically every state.
The usury laws not only fix maximum rates of interest but usually prescribe
remedies available to the victim. These remedies are designed (a) to relieve the
borrower from the necessity of paying interest in excess of the legal rate2 5 or any
interest whatever in some instances; 26 (b) to permit the borrower to offset the
amount of'excessive payments made by him, or multiples thereof, against the amount
otherwise recoverable by the lender; 27 (c) to permit the borrower to recover excessive
interest payments made by him, sometimes with an additional increment of one or
two times the amount of the excessive payments;2 8 and (d) to permit the borrower
to recover Principal payments made by him.29 In some states, if excessive charges
have been contracted for or received, the entire contract of loan is rendered void, both
as to principal and interest.30 A few statutes authorize equitable relief at the instance
of the borrower, 31 which may sometimes be obtained in the absence of statutory
authorization where the excesses of the lender have been so great as to warrant the
interposition of equity.3 2 Some statutes permit the granting of relief similar to
declaratory judgment upon the petition of the borrower 3 and this kind of relief may
sometimes be obtained under independent statutes or procedures.3 4 Some states
impose criminal penalties upon the taking of usury 5
Where the common device of casting loans in the form of wage purchases is used,
or where wage assignments are taken as security, statutes relating to wage assign-
ments come into play.36 They customarily impose various 'limitations upon the
amount of wages subject to effective assignment and upon the formalities of such
assignments, as well as prescribing the time within which assignments must be filed
with employers in order to be valid. Illegal assignments are often rendered totally
void, and are sometimes attended with criminal consequences.3 7 In some states loan
25 See the statutes of Del., Ind., Kan., Ky., La., Md., Mass., Mo., Nev., Ohio, Pa., Tenn., Vt., and
W. Va.
"' See the statutes of Ala., Ariz., Calif., D. C., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, Ill., Iowa, Mich., Miss., Mont.,
Neb., N. J., N. Mex., N. C., N. D., Okla.; S. C., S. D., Tex., Va., Wash., Wis., and Wyo.
17 See the statutes of Ala., Ariz., D. C., Ga., Hawaii, Ind., Kan., Mass., Mo., Neb., N. J., N. Mex,,
N. C., Ohio, Okla., S. C., S. D., Wash., and Wyo.
"' See the statutes of Ariz., Calif., Del., D. C., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Kan., Ky., La., Md., Minn., Miss,,
Mo., Mont., N. Mex., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Okla., Pa., S. C., S. D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt,, Va,,
W. Va., and Wis.
2o See the statutes of Miss. (where the rate of interest exceeds 20% per annum), and Utah.
See the statutes of Ark., Conn., Fla. (where the rate of interest exceeds 25% per annum), Minn,,
Miss. (where the rate of interest exceeds 20% per annum), N. Y., and Utah.
" See, for example, the statutes of Ark., Minn., N. Y., and Utah.8 5 See 66 CORPUS JuRIS 265 et seq., and Homer v. Nitsch, 103 Md. 498, 63 At. 1052 (19o6).
"' See the statutes of Mich., Minn., N. Y., and Utah.
"' See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) especially at 334 et seq.
"See the statutes of Calif., Conn., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Iowa, Mo., N. Mex., N. C., N. D., S. C., S. D.,
Utah, Wis., and Wyo.
"' In the absence of statute, assignments of unearned wages with certain limitations may be void at
common law. See 6 CORPUS JURIS SEC. so62 et seq.
"' See the statutes of Colo., Ill., Ind., Ky., La., Minn., Mont., Neb., N. J., N. Y., N. C., and Wis.
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contracts secured by illegal wage assignments are rendered void.38 Special interest
limitations are sometimes imposed upon loans secured by wage assignments.3 9 The
small loan laws of most states impose comparable restrictions upon wage assignments
and treat wage purchases and the profit thereon as loans and interest for purposes
of regulation.4"
Chattel mortgage laws41 frequently contain limitations on the manner of execution
and the types of property subject to liens of this nature. They may also require the
consent of the mortgagor's spouse 4 2 and judicial foreclosure on certain kinds of
property such as household furniture.43
Property exemption laws are generally designed to eliminate necessary tools and
household equipment from judicial seizure. In some states such property may not
become the subject of a chattel mortgage. Usually in addition to such laws there
are wage exemption laws which prohibit assignment or judicial seizure of a desig-
nated portion of earnings deemed necessary to maintain life.
Small loan laws perform an invaluable service by providing the legal setting essen-
tial to the establishment of a legitimate source of credit for wage earner borrowers,
thus eliminating the necessity to resort to loan sharks. Of more immediate im-
portance with respect to law enforcement, however, are the provisions which impose
criminal penalties upon the taking of excessive charges and other violations, those
which invalidate contracts of loan involving violations, and those which impose
responsibility for administration and enforcement upon a designated public official.
By providing drastic criminal and civil penalties and centralized responsibility for
enforcement, they not only tend to restrain the loan shark through fear of the severe
consequences of-infractions of the law, but they insure that the penalties will actually
be imposed through the efforts of the official whose duty it is to enforce the penal
provisions.
Banking laws, building and loan association laws, credit union laws, and indus-
trial banking laws, except insofar as they create legitimate competitive sources of
credit, usually contain little or nothing bearing upon the loan shark situation.
The foregoing laws provide in the main for individual remedies available to the
borrowers. Despite their ineffectiveness when their assertion is left to the efforts of
individual victims, they may be rendered highly effective by the activities of agencies
such as legal aid societies, labor unions, bar associations, newspapers, better business
bureaus, and comparable organizations, 44 willing to aid in asserting them on behalf
8 See the statutes of Colo., Ind., La., and Mont.
s" See the statutes of Colo., Ga., Ind., La., Md., Mont., N. J., and Tex.
,0 See HutAcHEx, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 103-110.
' See JONES, CHAT EL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES (Bowers Ed. 1933).
,See the statutes of Colo., Ill., Neb., N. H., N. J., N. C., N. D., and Ohio.
"See the statutes of Ill., Ind., and Ohio.
"See, for example, with respect to: (a) legal aid society-Atlanta Constitution, May 24, 1929;
(b) labor union-Report of the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor to the Sixtieth
Annual Convention (New Orleans, Nov. 15, 1940) 153; (c) bar association-Report of Committee of
Savannah (Ga.) Bar Association Appointed to Investigate Small Loan Business in that City (Am. Ass'n of
Personal Finance Cos., 1939); (d) newspaper-Louisville Herald-Post, Oct. 24, 1933; (e) better business
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of large numbers of borrowers. 45 Through economies resulting from handling of
cases in volume and through the selection of procedures permitting determination of
the rights of numerous borrowers in a single action, such efforts may sometimes have
"wholesale" results.
In addition to the criminal provisions of the usury, wage assignment, and small
loan laws, other criminal laws are applicable to the activities of loan sharks. Such
remedies are of course available to the state on its own behalf. All criminal prosecu-
tions have a unique advantage in loan shark matters. When the state may act in its
own capacity the original inertia resulting from the disadvantageous circumstances
of the borrower is eliminated, as well as the hazard that he will be coerced into dis-
missing his suit, once it has been instituted. Furthermore, a stigma results from a
criminal prosecution and conviction and not from a civil suit by a borrower. This
stigma, together with the risk of fine and imprisonment, constitutes a more effective
deterrent to a calloused loan shark than many civil penalties, especially when he may
expect vigorous and unrelenting efforts on the part of prosecuting officials.
A combination of persons to obtain usurious exactions has been held to constitute
the common law crime of conspiracy.46 This remedy is available in other states
which recognize this common law crime, and the same result could probably be
obtained in some 25 other states and territories47 where the crime is broadly defined
by statute. The wide range of evidence admissible in conspiracy prosecutions makes
this procedure specially attractive from a practical point of view.
A place of business where usurious agreements are habitually negotiated may be
a disorderly house. As early as 19o5 the public prosecutor of New Jersey prosecuted
loan sharks under the disorderly house statute and obtained at least two convictions.48
This remedy is no doubt available in many other states.
bureau-Special Report on Investigation of High Rate Loan Companies in Minneapolis, July 1, 1938 to
July 1, 1939, (Better Business Bureau of Minneapolis, Inc.); (f) chamber of commerce: Charlotte (N. C.)
Sunday Observer, Nov. 2o, 1932; (g) states attorney-Chicago Daily News and Chicago Evening Post,
Apr. 1, 1933); (h) chief of police-Waco (Tex.) Times-Herald, Feb. 27, 1928; (i) railroad corporation-
The Kentucky Post (Cincinnati Ed.), Apr. 21, 1933.
" This aspect of the matter is treated at length in the Report of the Special Committee of the Inter-
national Association of Governmental Labor Officials, supra note x.
" Commonwealth v. Donoghue, supra note 7- See also State v. Continental Purchasing Comlany, 119
N. J. L. 257, 195 Ad. 827 (Sup. Ct., 1938), afl'd per curiam, 121 N. J. L. 76, 1 Ad. (2d) 377 (1938),
where a combination to purchase obligations to pay money and to force their payment by means of undue
coercion was held to constitute a common law criminal conspiracy.
The appropriateness of this remedy is demonstrated by the following language from the latter opinion,
where, in refuting the contention that the indictment failed to set forth an indictable offense because the
objective and the means of accomplishment of the conspiracy were not criminal, it was said: "It is not
essential to criminal liability under the common law that the acts contemplated should constitute a
criminal offense for which, without the element of conspiracy, one alone could be indicted. The true rule
is that all such acts as have the necessary tendency to prejudice the public or to injure or oppress individuals
by unjustly subjecting them to the power of the conspirators are sufficiently tainted with the quality of
unlawfulness to satisfy the requirements as to conspiracy."
"Ala., Ariz., Ark., Calif., Colo., Conn., Fla., Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Me., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont.,
Nev. N. J., N. Y., N. D., Okla., Pa., S. D., Tenn., Wash., and Wis.
'S State v. Diamant, 73 N. J. L. 131, 62 Ad. 286 (59o5); State v. Martin, 77 N. J. L. 652, 73 At. 548
(19o9), afl'g 76 N. J. L. 292, 69 Al. xog (Sup. Ct., 19o8).
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The criminal codes of at least 12 states49 contain provisions that the doing of any
act prohibited by a statute and for which no other penalty is provided shall constitute
a misdemeanor. These provisions are obscure but they present broad possibilities.
Most loan sharks in the course of their activities perform acts which are prohibited
although unpenalized. In jurisdictions having such general misdemeanor statutes,
almost every loan shark contract may involve separate crimes and perhaps separate
penalties before it has been fully collected. The cumulative results may be rendered
grave for the offender.
Many loan sharks exert pressure on delinquent borrowers by sending .to them
documents fraudulently simulating judicial process such as summonses, or writs of
garnishment or attachment. Such acts are criminal under the laws of some states.
Also, the act of sending material of this nature through the mails with intent to
deceive a debtor has been held to constitute the federal crime of using the mails to
defraud.5 '
An illegal lender may also subject himself to criminal liability under tne federal
postal fraud laws5 2 under other circumstances. Any use of the postal facilities may
have that result when the method of doing business involves deception of borrowers.
It is not essential that the particular scheme shall have proved successful. The in-
tended victim need not actually have been misled. It is not essential that the material
sent through the mails itself contain anything fraudulent or deceptive. Any use of
the mails, no matter how innocuous in itself, constitutes such an offense if it is in
furtherance of a scheme to defraud. 53
Any lending scheme which involves a direct or implied misrepresentation, or con-
cealment of the true principal amount of a loan, of the fact that a lending transaction
is a loan, or of the validity or enforceability of a contract, may constitute a fraudulent
scheme within the meaning of the postal fraud laws. Any use of the mails in con-
nection with carrying on a lending business of this character, even if confined to
routine correspondence between headquarters and branch loan offices, may constitute
a use of the mails in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme. In a case previously referred
to, the activities of a collection agency in attempting to collect money not legally
owing by sending through the mails material designed to create the false impression
that a legally enforceable obligation existed were held to constitute the crime of
using the mail to defraud.
4
' Ariz., Ark., Idaho, Ill., Mich., Minn., Mont., Nev., N. Y., Okla., Tenn., and Wash.
so See, for example, ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith Hurd, 1934) c. 38, 5323.
" Lesselyoung v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 472 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 535.
52 18 U. S. C. A. §§338, 339. The efficacy of this remedy is enhanced by the drastic nature of the
penalties and by the fact that it eliminates much of the effectiveness of the common practice of avoiding
penalties by crossing state lines.
"' For an excellent treatise on the subject of postal frauds, see TAYLoR, POSTAL Fsus An CRiMEs
(193).
" Supra note 51. Much of the language of the court is directly applicable to the typical loan shark
scheme aimed at the gullible and the ignorant. For example, in refutation of the contentions that no
fraud had been practiced because the scheme would not have misled persons of average intelligence and
because the misrepresentations were of law and not of fact, the court said: "It is suffitient if the purpose
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Certain weapons exist for the most part independent of statutes. The first of these
is suggested by the foregoing discussion of postal frauds. The same common mis-
representations which are involved in the federal crime may also create rights of
rescission and redress in damages on the part of the borrower on the ground of
fraud, 56 or subject the lender to criminal penalties on the same ground under the
laws of a few states.56
Actions for slander, libel, malicious prosecution, or abuse of process may be main-
tained where as a result of attempts to collect from relatives or others the borrower's
credit or personal standing has been impaired, where suit has been wrongfully insti-
tuted upon an alleged debt not legally owing, or *where the borrower has been
discharged or otherwise injured through unlawful garnishment.5 7
Probably the two most effective weapons available against loan sharks are those
of injunction at the suit of the state and the' action of quo warranto, including
remedies incidental thereto such as the appointment of a receiver to aid in securing
compliance with the injunction or the order of ouster.
Quo warranto is applicable only against corporate loan sharks. Where .applicable
it affords much the same type of relief as that afforded by an injunction. The cor-
porate defendant may be ousted from the further exercise of its charter privileges"
or may be ousted merely from exercising its corporate powers in an unlawful man-
ner.59 Especially in the latter case the decree of ouster is in substance and generally
in form also an injunction. A small loan licensee has been ousted from its charter
privileges among other reasons because of its continued exaction of excessive
charges.6 0
In the article on injunction and receiverships elsewhere in this symposium, the
was to defraud any person or persons whomsoever. The scheme was leveled against those most vulnerable
to deception and naturally was less likely to succeed with people of highest intelligence or broadest
experience.
... The maxim, that ignorance of the law does not excuse, has no application here. . . . So the
general rule that a fraudulent representation, to be available must be of fact and not of law, is subject to
exception. This is especially true in a case of this nature. Deception under certain circumstances may
be practiced upon the unsophisticated and unwary, even though the representation made involves law
as well as fact. Particularly is this true when it is an insidious one, consisting of a series of plausible
statements, calculated by their insistence to break down the feeble judgment of those to whom they are
made, and gradually to inspire belief and acceptance. The demurrer to the indictment was therefore
properly overruled."
"s ,VBB, LAw oF UsuRY (1899) §342. See 27 CORPUS JuRIs I 10 et Seq.
"' See Liversage v. Gibson, 222 Ala. 672, 133 So. 715 (1931); Hardy v. Lewis Automobile Company,
297 S. W. 169 (Mo. App., 1927); and Adair v. James M. Peterson Bank, 61 Utah 159, 255 Pac. 683
(1922).
For a vivid description of the extent to which the process of garnishment has ucer abused in justice of
the peace courts in oppressing large numbers of small borrowers, see Shaw v. Fox, supra note 7.
" See Trust Co. of Georgia v. State, supra note 13; State ex rel. Spillman, Att'y Gen. v. Central
Purchasing Co., z18 Neb. 383, 225 N. W. 46 (1929); Stockton v. Central R. of New Jersey, 5o N. J. Eq.
52, 24 Ad. 964 (1892); Commonwealth v. Banks, 198 Pa. 397, 48 Ad. 277 (19ox), af'g 9. Pa. Dist. R.
436 (igoo); Att'y Gen. v. Railroad Companies, 35 Wis. 425 (1874).
' See People v. Toledo, etc., R. R., 28o Ill. 495, 117 N. E. 701 (17) State v. Portland Natural Gas
Co., 153 Ind. 483, 53 N. E" 5o89 (1899); State v. Old Town Bridge Corp., 85 Me. 17, 26 At. 947 (1892);
Malone v. New York, etc. R. R., 197 Mass. 194, 83 N. E. 408 (1go8).
" See State ex rel. v. Family Loan Co., supra note 6.
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marked advantages of equitable relief of this type as contrasted with other rem-
edies, are demonstrated. Upon an appropriate showing, such equitable relief may
properly be granted against a loan shark.6 ' This form of relief extends to the
prevention of public injuries. The court may thus not only enjoin the making of
future usurious loan contracts but, equally important, it may minimize the damaging
effects of past illegal transactions by enjoining the collection of the contracts resulting
therefrom. In order to insure obedience to the latter mandate, the existing contracts
may be ordered impounded under the control of an officer of the court. From the
loan shark's point of view, this relief is equitable and free of harshness because it
imposes no criminal punishment.
In summation, any program of law enforcement designed to achieve maximum
results in the small loan field requires a proper appreciation of several important
factors. One is the extent of the injury to-the public welfare which results from the
exploitation of individual borrowers, the degree of helplessness of these borrowers,
and the consequent need for action by public agencies if the public welfare is to be
protected. Another is the inadequacy of usury laws and the consequent necessity to
resort to remedies provided by laws of other types. Still another is the necessity to
concentrate upon removing the inducement for making illegal small loans by
eliminating the prospect of profit therefrom and by so enlarging the risk of criminal
consequences as to overcome the desire for those profits. And further, there is the
necessity to comprehend and to expose the true purpose of the innumerable devices
employed by illegal lenders to avoid the impact of the laws which they violate.
" See the authorities cited in the article by Field, injunction and Receivership Proceedings Against
Illegal Lenders, infra p. ioo.
